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Abstract 
The People’s Republic of China is an indispensable political and economic force in Asia. With 
the majority of the United States’ foreign economic interests invested in the Asia-Pacific region, 
the leading role that China is taking is a major concern. The Asia-Pacific region is strategically 
important to the US. How US policy makers craft foreign policy toward Asia has a direct impact 
on US involvement in the region. Unless the US becomes more invested in Asia, develops a 
comprehensive understanding of China’s role in the region, and proactively pursue strategic 
relationships, US influence in Asian affairs will become a thing of the past. This paper will 
explore the growing economic role that China is playing in the Asia region, and provide future 
foreign policy recommendations for the US government.   
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China and the New Asia: 
Policy Recommendations 
 
“We cannot enter into alliances until we are acquainted with the designs of our neighbors.” 
-Sun Tzu, Art of War 
 
 Over the past several years, China has become one of the most influential and powerful 
nation sates in the world, and has become an indispensable economic force in Asia. China’s 
increased political activism and involvement in Asia is rapidly overshadowing US influence in 
the region, and the leading role that China is taking is a major concern. An increase in assertive 
and defiant Chinese attitudes toward US presence in Asia is a threat to US foreign policy. Unless 
significant policy changes are made that reflect recognition of China’s strategic role in the 
region, US influence in Asia will become insignificant. In order for the US to have a realistic, 
practical foreign policy toward China, US policy makers must have a comprehensive 
understanding of how China interacts with various countries in Asia on a local and regional 
level.  The US government must recognize China’s leading role in the region, and develop a 
comprehensive strategy where the US can “help influence the direction that China takes in its 
new role.”1 
 For middle power and third world countries in the Asia region, China’s economic rise has 
been viewed in a positive light. The current Obama administration has publically promised to 
reengage with the Asia region. However, US influence and involvement in foreign affairs has 
                                                          
1
 Ralph A. Cossa, Brad Glosserman, Michael A. Mcevitt, Nirav Patel, James Przystup, and Brad Roberts, 
The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region: Security Strategy for the Obama Administration (Washington, DC: 
Center for New American Security, 2009), 52. 
CHINA  5 
 
been stretched throughout the western and eastern hemisphere, limiting the resources that can be 
focused on the Asia region. The US must learn to strike a delicate balance between allocating 
their resources wisely in order to maintain a constant presence in the Asia region, without 
appearing to be an overbearing power interfering with the sovereignty of countries in the region. 
Although it may be impossible for China and the US to become allies  in the near future, if US 
policy makers can make well informed decisions, hostile relations between the two countries can 
be avoided and Beijing and Washington can become strategic economic partners. The US must 
pursue strategic relationships among the core countries in the Asia region, recognizing that 
China’s relationship with its neighbors ultimately affect how Beijing relates to Washington. 
Although China will not surpass the US economy in the near future, China is and will continue to 
be a leading economic power house in the Asia region, and continue to largely contribute to the 
global market. This paper will investigate China’s rise and its strategic role in the Asia region, 
and provide future strategic foreign policy recommendations for the US government.  
  
The Significance of the Asia Region 
The Rise of China 
China is arguably becoming one of the most important countries in the Asia-Pacific 
region. With the strengthening of the People’s Liberation Army, and the nation’s growing 
population, Western powers are becoming increasingly concerned about the country’s foreign 
policy intentions. However, in sharp contrast to former president Jiang Zemin, current Chinese 
President Hu Jintao is practicing a more flexible and open form of foreign policy, which China 
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has never displayed in the past.2 The driving force “… behind Chinese foreign policy under Hu 
has been the need to access energy and raw materials to support China’s rapid economic 
growth.”3 However, Hu has recognized that a healthy relationship between the US and China is 
crucial to improving and developing the Asia-Pacific region.4  In January 2011, during a speech 
at the US-China Business Council in Washington, Hu presented a five-point diplomatic plan 
encouraging greater cooperation between China and the US.5 During the speech, Hu promised 
that “China would ‘never seek hegemony or pursue an expansionist policy’ in foreign affairs.”6 
The Chinese seem to understand that the Sino-US relationship is based on “cooperation and 
friendship,” yet is “complicated and challenging.”7 Although China has been diplomatic in its 
relations with its strategic partners as of date, there is concern over how far China is going to 
exert its growing power over nations if resources become a rare commodity.  For example, China 
“controls more than 90% of current global supply of rare-earth metals …” and have begun to 
stockpile their ample supply of them, while simultaneously reducing exports to countries that 
need them.8  Beijing introduced a plan last year that would allow state run companies to merge 
industries and modify exports, which would drive up the prices.9 This should be of concern to the 
US because according to the Pentagon, “while only 5% of demand for rare-earth metals in the 
                                                          
2
 “China and Northeast Asia- External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment, 2009, 
http://sentinel.janes.com. (accessed March 27, 2009). 
3
 “China and Northeast Asia- External Affairs,” Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment. 
4
 Bob David and Patrick O’Conner, “Lawmakers Try, Fail to Pin Down Hu,” The Wall Street Journal, 
January 21, 2011, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704881304576093830120490372.html. 
(accessed Feb 26, 2011). 
5
 Ibid. 
6
 Ibid. 
7
 Le Yucheng, “Harmonious Relationship,” China Daily, Jan 31, 2011, 
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-01/31/content_11943162.htm. (accessed Mar 29, 2011). 
8
 James T. Areddy, “China Moves to Strengthen Grip Over Supply of Rare-Earth Metals,” Wall Street 
Journal, http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704124504576117511251161274.html (accessed Mar 29, 
2011). 
9
 David Barboza, “China Weighs Tighter Controls on Rare Elements,” New York Times, June 2, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/06/03/business/energy-environment/03rare.html. (accessed Mar 29, 2011). 
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U.S. comes from the military, the U.S. is nevertheless ‘completely reliant on China for the 
production of some of [the Pentagon's] most powerful weapons.’"10 
With the majority of US foreign interests invested in the Asia-Pacific region, the leading 
role that China is taking in the region should be causing major concern. America should not 
ignore the Asia-Pacific region for the following reasons: First, the region’s economic role is 
strategically important, generating “30 percent of global exports,”11 and holding “two-thirds of 
global foreign exchange reserves.”12 Second, China owns “more than $1trillion of US debt,”13 
and holds over “$3 trillion in foreign reserves.”14 Globalization has caused nations to become 
closely intertwined, and the countries with the largest populations, natural resources, and 
economic advantage, such as China, South Korea and India, are rapidly taking the lead in Asia.  
China, Asia’s largest communist nation, and the region’s largest capitalist country, is playing a 
significant role in economic growth in the region.   
As Beijing expands its influence in Asia, the US’ relationship with China has become 
increasingly important. This year, China officially claimed the status of the world’s second 
largest economy, overtaking Japan’s 40 year hold on the position.15 China’s rapid growth and 
political leverage is seen among many Western states as a threat to Asia. However, Asian 
countries that economically depend on China for their resources and financial investments see 
China’s growth as an opportunity to increase their financial revenue. China actively invests in its 
                                                          
10
 David Barboza, “China Weighs Tighter Controls on Rare Elements.” 
11
 Cossa, et. al.  The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region, 3. 
12
 Shaun Narine, “From Conflict to Collaboration: Institution-building in East Asia,” Behind The Headlines 
65, no. 5 (2008): 2. 
13Ibid., 3. 
14
 Ibid., 2. 
15
 Justin McCurry and Julia Kollewe, “China overtakes Japan’s world’s second-largest economy,” 
Guardian.co.uk, Feb 14, 2011, http://www.guardian.co.uk/business/2011/feb/14/china-second-largest-economy. 
(accessed April 3, 2011). 
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neighbors, recognizing the importance of capitalizing on other’s natural resources. Asian 
countries in the Southeast Asia region are predicted to grow an average of 6.8% by 2012, 
positively correlating with the projected numbers for China’s growth.16 For Asian countries, a 
decline in Chinese growth would have devastating effects.  
The annual increase of China’s overseas direct investment (ODI) is a good example of 
how heavily Beijing is investing in the Asia region. The Chinese standard when dealing with 
foreign countries is very lax, demonstrating a willingness to do business with corrupt 
governments and underdeveloped countries with unstable legal structures.17  This provides 
Beijing with a much wider portfolio and more investing opportunities than the US, who is very 
cautious when it comes to business dealings with foreign business and governments.18 China is 
invested in over 180 countries, and its ODI is mainly focused on the service industry, natural 
resources, and technology.19 An analysis of China’s foreign direct investment shows that Beijing 
has been increasingly focusing on infrastructure projects, and “ranks first among developing 
countries, and 5th among all countries” in infrastructure investments.20 This type of ODI 
investment is vastly different from the US portfolio which focuses on outsourcing and accessing 
foreign markets.21 These trends are significant because every investment that the Chinese make 
is “aimed at strengthening production at home.”22 In 2009, China’s Export-Import Bank lent over 
                                                          
16
 “China’s economy will continue to drive Asian growth,” Economist Intelligence Unit, March 16, 2011, 
http://gfs.eiu.com/Article.aspx?articleType=rf&articleId=1147886899&secId=3. (accessed Mar 24, 2011). 
17
 Le, “Harmonious Relationship.”  
18
 Ibid. 
19
 Yiping Huang, “Traps for Chinese investment overseas,” East Asia Forum, Sept 10, 2010, 
http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2010/09/10/traps-for-chinese-investment-overseas/. (accessed Mar 25, 2011). 
20
 Huang, “Traps for Chinese investment overseas.” 
21
 Le, “Harmonious Relationship.” 
22
 Ibid. 
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$174.2 billion, investing in agriculture and natural resources around the world.23  In contrast, The 
World Bank lent only one fourth that amount in 2009.24   
China is the world’s largest exporter and manufacturer, and with a booming economy, 
China attracts a large amount of Foreign Direct Investment from various countries.25 In an effort 
to capitalize on investment opportunities in the PRC, “China received about 20 percent of all FDI 
to developing countries over the last 10 years.”26 Over 50 percent of China’s exports and imports 
are a result of foreign invested enterprises.27 In addition, the local sales of products made by US 
companies located within China grew 431 percent “between 2000 and 2008.”28 Moreover, “more 
than 90 percent of sales by US majority-owned companies operating in China over the last 
decade were to China or other foreign markets, with a mere 8 percent being exported back to the 
United States.”29 Needless to say, economic trade with China has become a crucial element of 
growth and profit for the US economy and US owned businesses. With investments in 
agricultural and resources, China is leaving footprints all across Asia, indirectly influencing 
domestic policies in various countries as a result.  
On March 5, 2011 Premier Wen Jiabao announced his country’s economic growth target 
during the opening assembly of the National People’s Congress. For 2011, Wen announced that 
                                                          
23
 Lindsey Eckelmann, “Complex Connections: Ecological Impacts of Chinese Investment in Southeast 
Asia,” Wilson Center, Oct 20, 2010, 
http://www.wilsoncenter.org/ondemand/index.cfm?fuseaction=home.play&mediaid=EE526568-D563-3550-
0D8643B908AD3697. (accessed 21 March 2011). 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 The World Bank, “Securing the Present, Shaping the Future,” World Bank East Asia and Pacific 
Economic Update 2011 Vol. 1, 21 Mar 2011, 6, 
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26
 World Bank, “Foreign Direct Investment-the China Story,” July 17, 2010, 
http://go.worldbank.org/HNQ2VVW7H0. (accessed Mar 25, 2011). 
27
 Ibid. 
28
 US Business Council, “US-China Trade Policy: Issues and Solutions.” 
29
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China will aim to increase its economic growth by “around 8 percent.”30 This is the same modest 
target amount that was set in 2010, where China’s real GDP growth increased from 9.2% in 2009 
to 10.3% in 2010.31 Although China’s GDP growth is predicted to fall below 9% by 2012, these 
numbers are significantly higher than US GDP growth which is expected to fall below 3% by 
2012.32 In 2009, China was America’s “third-largest export market for goods” and the numbers 
released for 2010 have completely surpassed those of 2009.33 These numbers have generated 
unwarranted fears that China will overtake the US in the near future.  
Some researchers have predicted that China may overtake the US as the worlds’ largest 
economy in the next twenty years.34 However, these predictions are merely based on China’s 
economic trends over the past 30 to 60 years. The China that will exist in 2040 will be vastly 
different from the China in 1979, just as the China in 1979 was different from the China of 
1949.35 Any number of events, nature or man-made, could drastically alter China’s internal 
order. Forecasting too far ahead, especially in regards to such a large communist nation as China 
can prove to be pointless. If the PRC’s demographic trends, economic growth, and GDP data is 
analyzed correctly, one can conclude that it is highly unlikely that China will surpass the US 
economy in the near future. Although China is the largest capitalist nation in the region, its core 
is still driven by deep communist policies. The Chinese economic growth is closely monitored 
                                                          
30Andrew Higgins, “Chinese Parliament Opens With Grand Pledges,” The Washington Post, March 5, 2011 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/04/AR2011030406785.html?wpisrc=nl_cuzhead. 
(accessed March 5, 2011). 
31
 “China’s economy will continue to drive Asian growth,” Economist Intelligence Unit. 
32
 Economist Intelligence Unit, “Global Outlook Summary,” March 12, 2011, Economist Intelligence Unit 
Limited 2011, March 12, 2011, gfs.eiu.com, 4. (accessed Mar 24, 2011). 
33
 US-China Business Council, “US-China Trade Policy: Issues and Solutions,” Testimony of the US-China 
Business Council, before the House Committee on Ways and Means, United States Senate, Feb 9, 2011. 
(Washington, DC), 1, http://www.uschina.org/public/documents/2011/02/china_trade_policy.pdf. 
34
 The World Bank, “World Bank East Asia and Pacific Economic Update,” 6. 
35
 Derek Scissors, “10 China Myths for the New Decade,” Jan 28, 2010, The Heritage Foundation, 
http://www.heritage.org/Research/Reports/2010/01/10-China-Myths-for-the-New-Decade, (accessed 22 Mar 2011). 
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and restricted by the state government, and if reforms in the system are not made, it will 
inevitably lead to an economic halt, destabilizing the country’s industrial drive.  
Another reason that China will most likely not overtake the US economy is the country’s 
demographics. China’s favorable demographics of the working class have contributed to its 
increased growth over the past few decades. However, over the next 30 years or so, the Chinese 
population will begin to age, and reflect statistics and an environment that is more reminiscent of 
Japans current aging population.36 If current trends continue, China’s working-age population 
will decline from the overpowering 47 percent in 1985 to merely 26 percent in 2030.37 China’s 
real GDP growth is also often misinterpreted.  GDP growth is what is generally used to measure 
a country’s economic contribution and expansion. Instead of significantly leading the world in 
economic growth, China actually “detracts from the rest of the world’s growth in gross domestic 
product (GDP).”38 At first glance, because China has a large amount of trade surplus, China 
appears to be the leading global power in economic growth in GDP. However, trade surplus 
merely “adds to GDP and a trade deficit takes away from it.”39 Therefore, due to China’s 
overwhelming trade surplus, “the rest of the world runs a large trade deficit with the PRC.”40  
Americans have become privy to the politicization of information, and have become 
increasingly pessimistic of America’s leading economic role in the world, becoming weary of 
China’s growing influence in world politics and in the international marketplace. When 
Americans were asked what country they believed was the “leading economic power in the 
world today,” and were asked to choose between the US, the European Union, Russia, China, 
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 Scissors, “10 China Myths for the New Decade.” 
37
 Ibid. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Ibid. 
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Japan, and India, 52% of the respondents said China, while only 32% answered the United 
States.41 Public perception plays an important part in politics and government morale. Although 
the US is still the world’s leading power, it appears that “the majority of Americans believe the 
U.S. has already lost the challenge.”42 Another poll conducted by the Pew Research Center, the 
Washington Post, and ABC news also validated this concern when 61% of respondents 
considered “China as a threat to jobs and economic security.”43 It seems that Americans are no 
longer confident that the US will continue to play a strong role in foreign affairs.  Although 
China will not surpass the US economy in the near future, China is and will continue to be a 
leading economic power house in the Asia region, and continue to largely contribute to the 
global market. Although the global benefit of economic cooperation in the Asia-Pacific region is 
tremendous, the region’s restrictions on capitalism and open markets could hinder the global 
economy in the long run.44   
In an op-ed by a member of China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, US Secretary of State 
Hillary Clinton was quoted as saying that although China and the US are “walking on different 
roads,” they are headed “to the same destination with a shared future and responsibilities.”45 The 
author of this op-ed integrated Hillary Clinton’s comment with his own thoughts, concluding that 
“selfish interests” should not get in the way of the growing cooperative Sino-US relationship.46  
The author, however, did not define or specify what he meant by selfish interests. The US and 
China have very different cultures, values, and history of government. The bilateral relationship 
                                                          
41
 Lydia Saad, “China Surges in American’s Views of Top World Economy,” Feb 14, 2011, Gallup, Mar 
21, 2011, http://www.gallup.com/poll/146099/china-surges-americans-views-top-world-economy.aspx. (accessed 
April 3, 2011). 
42
 Ibid. 
43
 Ibid. 
44
 Cossa et.al., The United States and the Asia-Pacific Region, 7. 
45
 Yucheng, “Harmonious Relationship.” 
46
 Ibid. 
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among the two nations will always be driven by the host country’s national security interests. If 
the author is hoping that both countries will put aside their own nations’ interests when 
negotiating and dealing with each other, he is unaware of the true nature of the current state of 
affairs.  
US Involvement 
After the Cold War, with the threat of Communism suppressed, many Americans 
believed it was no longer necessary to invest politically, economically, and militarily in the Asia-
Pacific region. Fortunately, however, the US was aware that stifling Communist expansionism 
was leaving a deep and dangerous void in Asia that was going to be filled by either another 
ideology or a hegemonic nation. Thus, America sought to utilize their profitable relationships in 
Southeast Asia to help stabilize the region and promote democratic values. US military presence 
in the region post WWII and post Cold War helped stabilize Asia, allowing Asian nations to 
focus solely on rebuilding their government and growing economically without concerning 
themselves with security threats. For example, the US placed permanent military troops in Japan, 
securing a stronger relationship between the two countries, and providing assurance for the 
Japanese that they would be protected if they were attacked by a foreign power.  The US also led 
diplomatic discussions and the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in an effort to discourage 
Russian expansion. The Japan-America Security Alliance, the Korea-America Security Alliance, 
and the Australia-New Zealand-United States treaty are also just a few examples of security 
agreements that have reassured Asia of US interests and presence in the region.47  
                                                          
47Chin Kin Wah and Pang Eng Fong, “Relating the U.S.-Korea and U.S.-Japan Alliances to Emerging Asia 
Pacific multilateral Processes: An ASEAN Perspective,” Shorenstein APARC, (March 2000), 24, 
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Shortly after the tragic terrorist attack of September 11, 2001, the US government 
expressed a renewed interest in Southeast Asia. Former President George W. Bush declared that 
“Southeast Asia was the second front in the global war on terrorism.” 48 This second front, 
however, was short-lived. Due to the recent US economic crisis and increased focus on 
counterterrorism efforts in the Middle East, American interests and investment in the Asia-
Pacific region have been moved to the periphery. There has been an increased focus on 
strengthening multilateral ties and engaging in dialogue exclusively among Asian nations, which 
has quietly begun to alienate America from input in the region. It is in the US’ national security 
interests to encourage and promote a secure non-threatening environment in Asia that will 
benefit the US. However, it is impossible for the US to pursue an effective foreign policy plan if 
policy makers in Washington are not intimately aware of the geopolitical trends of the region, 
and how it affects US national security.  US foreign interests need to be refocused, reevaluated, 
and readjusted to the new evolving environment in order for the US to fulfill its national security 
objectives and pursue the nation’s best interest in the region. It is crucial to understand China’s 
significant relationship with its geopolitical neighbors, and its influence over Asia’s political, 
military, and economic policies. With the majority of the US foreign economic interests invested 
in the Asia-Pacific region, the leading role that China is taking in the region is a major concern. 
China’s Role in the Region 
China’s Worldview 
China has a very different view of international relations and foreign policy compared to 
the West. Rosemary Foot explained the situation well when she described China’s view of the 
                                                          
48
 Donald E. Weatherbee, International Relations in Southeast Asia: The Struggle for Autonomy, 
(Rowmand & Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 2005), 1. 
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world as a “… concentration on trends in world politics, a concern to be taken seriously as a peer 
by dominant states, and a felt need to express a leadership role towards the developing world.”49 
Chinese understanding of globalization also reflects its future goals and global aspirations. 
According to an article in International Security, the Chinese define globalization as “… there 
are no absolute winners or absolute losers’ and implies that we do not live in a ‘zerosum’ 
world.”50 For US policy makers, understanding the Chinese definition of globalization is 
important because it sheds light on the fact that the Chinese see negative aspects of a market 
based economy and international involvement. For Beijing, some aspects of globalization are 
seen as negative because their nation—especially their financial market place—is vulnerable and 
affected by the stability or instability of other nations.51 On the other hand, global trading can 
also be used as leverage for influencing international affairs. The US is so closely connected to 
China that Beijing’s economic investment can “act as a restraint on US power.”52 
The Chinese mindset of treating the region and its countries as one entity (tianxia) has 
been very successful in regards to multilateral arrangements in Asia. One reason for this is when 
small nations ally themselves with China, they believe that they no longer have to fear China 
trying to “mold them into their image.” America often requires drastic changes such as halting 
human rights violations, or insisting on major democratic reforms, before they are willing to 
partner with foreign countries. China, on the other hand, openly engages in business dealings 
with corrupt governments, consequently able to build a wider and more global economic 
                                                          
49
 Rosemary Foot, "Chinese Strategies in a US-Hegemonic Global Order: Accommodating and Hedging." 
International Affairs 82, no. 1 (2006): 79 
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portfolio than the US.  In addition, when US policy makers focus solely on larger nations in the 
region, it communicates to the surrounding countries that they are not as important. Although 
Washington cannot completely ignore human rights abuses or disregard governmental 
corruption, the US must create a more robust foreign policy strategy that is prepared to deal with 
the complex dynamics of the region.   
Taiwan: Chinese vs. US Policy 
 Currently, one of the most important and disputed topics in Chinese relations is the 
delicate and tense diplomatic and military dance between Mainland China and Taiwan. This has 
resulted in a cultivation of feelings of resistance toward US presence in the region and hostility 
towards America’s attempt to intervene in China’s domestic affairs. This anti-American shift is a 
threat to US foreign policy, and could cause major damage to US presence and influence in the 
region. Chinese officials have publically criticized US policies numerous times on issues of vital 
US interests, especially in regards to Taiwan. For example, China’s foreign minister Jiang Yu 
made a public statement about the selling of arms to Taiwan:  “We urge the US to clearly 
recognize the severe consequences of arms sales to Taiwan and adhere to the three Sino-US joint 
communiqués, especially the principles established in the Joint Communiqué on August 17, 
1982."53 The Chinese believe that this communiqué clearly does not allow for the US to continue 
selling arms to Taiwan. However, a close examination of the document shows the Taiwan arms 
issues was not resolved between President Ronald Reagan and Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang. 
The second point of the communiqué reads: “The question of United States arms sales to Taiwan 
was not settled in the course of negotiations between the two countries on establishing 
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 Armen Hareyan, “US China Hostility Tops The 2010 List of Risks,” Huliq, Jan 7, 2010,  
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diplomatic relations. The two sides held differing positions, and the Chinese side stated that it 
would raise the issue again following normalization. Recognizing that this issue would seriously 
hamper the development of United States-China relations, they have held further discussions on 
it, during and since the meetings….”54  
 For years, the US has naively held a contradictory China—Taiwan policy. America has 
continued to pursue a “one China” policy, discouraging Chinese aggression toward Taiwan, 
while simultaneously selling defensive weapons to Taipei through the Taiwan Relations Act. The 
“one China” policy prevents Washington from intervening in Taiwan-China relations, even if it 
is in US interests.55  The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), passed by Congress in 1979, 
demonstrated US commitment towards Taiwan, and has contributed to the creation of a quasi-
ally relationship between Washington and Taipei.56 Politicians in Washington must realize that 
the meaning of “one China” is significantly different when used in America and China. To the 
PRC, it means stifling advancement, creativity, and progress, and subjugating the people of 
Taiwan to the historical communist state of China.57 When the US promotes a “one China” 
policy in diplomatic and political circles, they are hoping to communicate the desire for a 
peaceful compromise and a world where communism and democracy can live together under a 
flexible government.  In the “Shanghai Communiqué,” President Nixon agreed that “there is only 
one China and that Taiwan is a part of China.”58  According to Nixon, the Shanghai 
Communiqué allowed Washington and Beijing to “temporarily set aside the ‘crucial question 
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obstructing the normalization of relations.’”59  To endorse freedom, democracy, and peace, and 
help other countries secure these ideals for their own country, the US must learn when to 
intervene in another country’s affairs, and when to refrain. US policy toward Taiwan and China 
must be realistic and achievable, and have its national interest always in mind. However, 
promoting democracy and freedom is always in America’s national interest. 
There has been a dramatic increase in Taiwanese self-identification, and Chinese hostility has 
further increased the unity of the island. The Chinese people's identity has begun to wane, and 
the people of Taiwan have begun to distinguish themselves as Taiwanese. Author J. Bruce 
Jacobs appropriately refers to this trend as the “Taiwanisation” of Taiwan.60  In 1992, the 
Election Study Center at National Chengchi University began to conduct a survey to study the 
trend of nationalization in Taiwan. By 2004, the respondents who answered that they were 
“Taiwanese” only, rather than “Chinese,” increased two and a half times.61 In 2005, the Gallup 
Organization conducted a worldwide survey consisting of ordinary citizens and world leaders, 
and discovered that more than 60% of those surveyed “saw Taiwan and China as two separate 
countries.”62  
China is entirely opposed to Taiwan independence and its desire to join the UN as an 
independent state.63 According to Chinese official documents, the Taiwan issue has already been 
solved, and Taiwan is currently considered as China’s 23rd province.64  China is already heavily 
invested in Taiwan, and has a strong national interest in keeping the state stable. For example the 
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PRC and Hong Kong contribute to 40% of Taiwan’s exports.65 According to China’s National 
Defense White Paper in 2008, “The attempts of the separatist forces for "Taiwan independence" 
to seek "de jure Taiwan independence" have been thwarted, and the situation across the Taiwan 
Straits has taken a significantly positive turn.”66 On the other hand, in the same report, “separatist 
forces seeking ‘Taiwan Independence’” are listed as one of the major security threats to the 
country. 67  
 Operating under the assumption that Taiwan is already a part of China, Beijing has used 
its resources, political influence, and leverage to isolate Taiwan from joining important 
international organizations and participating in vital global conferences as an independent 
country whenever possible.68  For example, China has limited Taiwan’s participation in the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), rejected its request to join the United Nations and the 
World Health Organization as an independent state, and has aggressively implored foreign 
nations to support a “One China principle.”69 China has been unwilling to budge on their policy 
toward Taiwan, as was evidenced in Hu’s recent speech where he stated that their relationship 
with Taiwan “concern China's sovereignty and territorial integrity" and represent China's "core 
interest."70 China has increased “the numbers of short-range ballistic missiles aimed at Taiwan” 
and has also invested money and resources into improving and empowering its blue water 
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navy.71  Not only has China been increasing its military capabilities, it is also utilizing political 
pressures to subjugate Taiwan. In 2005, an Anti-Succession Law was passed in China, banning 
any speech in favor of Taiwan independence.72 China has also aggressively attempted to isolate 
Taiwan from the rest of the world, discouraging foreign countries from developing diplomatic 
relationships with Taiwan by offering monetary incentives such as foreign aid.73 Taiwan’s 
unofficial status and Beijing’s insistence on a “one China” policy has prevented Taipei from 
improving its international status and economic relations with strategic neighbors. In addition, 
although Taiwan has been able to build official relations with several pacific nations such as the 
Solomon and Marshall Islands, relations with these “failed states” have not proven to be 
mutually beneficial.74 Recognizing the importance of Taiwan’s contributions to the region, the 
US must discourage the spread of communism, and promote the growth of democracy by 
example. This can be done through encouraging other nations to partner with Taiwan 
economically and cooperate in various global efforts such as counterterrorism.75   
Predicting that Beijing and Moscow would most likely retaliate with military force, 
Washington has continually urged Taiwan to refrain from seeking independence as doing so 
would cause major damage and instability in the region.76 China has maintained a strong “one-
China policy,” and has sought regional support on the issue.77 China has become more 
aggressive and manipulative in its policy against Taiwan, and until the circumstances are 
resolved, the “pressure” and “strong suggestions” that the ASEAN Regional Forum makes in 
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recommendation of China’s actions will not change China’s mind. “Such is the constitutive 
power of Chinese realism, which enables China to change while actively fashioning the world in 
her own image.”78 
 Taiwan’s democratic government and free market policies have created a gateway for 
positive US influence in the region. Nevertheless, Washington has continued to publicly support 
Beijing, a communist authoritarian-totalitarian regime, while downplaying democratic Taiwan’s 
quest for independence.79  China has become a major political and military power in Asia, and 
the risks of supporting an independent Taiwan has significantly increased. According to former 
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice, the US is responsible for keeping China’s growth from 
becoming a threat to the region.80 Interestingly, for US policy makers, supporting a democratic 
and independent Taiwan is not considered as one of the options for decreasing China’s threat in 
the region.   
Why Taiwan? 
 Despite Washington’s seemingly apathetic attitude, the US should have a significant 
interest in Taiwan remaining separate from communist China, and maintaining its own 
democratic government. China’s economic growth, however, has provided Beijing with the 
ability to use “soft power” to encourage their neighbors to pursue specific policies, and Taiwan is 
the key to China’s diplomatic power in the region.81 Taiwan is strategically important to 
America, and plays a vital role in the Asian economy. Taiwan is the third largest exporting 
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country in the region, America’s ninth largest trading partner.”82 Maintaining Taiwan as an ally 
would also provide the US with access to geostrategic chokepoints in the Asia region. It is in 
close proximity to Japan’s main sea-lane and pathway to the Middle East, and a strategic access 
point for trade and transportation in the Pacific Ocean for the US and East Asia as a whole.83  
Taiwan and the US cooperate in defense and intelligence issues as well. Taiwan is one of 
America’s biggest importers of defensive weapons. The selling and purchasing of fighter aircraft 
has also opened up a new market for American products and labor in the country, improving 
relations between Taiwan and the US.84 
 There are several problems with current US policy toward Taiwan. First, it was created to 
maintain the “status quo.” The term “status quo,” however, has never been defined. Second, 
Taiwan is a democracy, and therefore the Cold War strategy of deterrence is ineffective. The 
current “one China” policy is also undermining the US’ ability to promote its national security 
interests. In the past, the US has been able to set trends in economic and political policy. In order 
to secure one of America’s most important democratic relationship in Asia, Washington must 
increase their trade with Taiwan, and focus on strengthening various partnerships and cooperate 
on non-defense type projects such as health, the environment, and humanitarian aid.85  
Regional Integration 
Globalization has caused nation-states to no longer be the only primary actors in the Asia 
region. The globalization of the world and the ability to easily communicate with foreign 
countries and foreign leaders has birthed an intricate connection between nations that is 
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unprecedented. The instantaneous sharing of information through technology and the internet has 
increasingly fueled globalization, and has provided the world’s eastern hemisphere with the tools 
to rapidly grow and expand its sphere of influence. This has spurred many states to begin 
investing time, energy, and resources into building multilateral and regional organizations such 
as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO) to guarantee security from threatening non-state actors and to ensure border 
security.86  
Political and economic problems are more often than not agitators and motivators for 
instability in the region. Regional integration, or regionalism, is an integral part of Asia, 
especially in the area of politics.87 There has been a growing effort to focus on transnational 
security and cooperation in Asia, and geopolitics has taken on an increasingly important role 
over the past ten years in the Asia-Pacific region, due to the numerous traditional and 
nontraditional threats that have begun to surface. The interdependency among Asian nations due 
to trade, global capitalism, and commerce has shifted the focus from domestic concerns to 
transnational security concerns.  The Asia region’s “increasing interest in multilateral 
cooperation,” has drawn international attention.88  The creation of ASEAN, the SCO, the East 
Asia Summit, and the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation are just a few yet prominent examples 
of the region’s attempt to build a community and a regional identity.89  
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As China increases its power and influence in the region, China and its neighbors are 
creating allies of their own without US support or involvement. China is involved in multiple 
regional security dialogues, including the APT, ASEAN Plus One, and the Shanghai Cooperation 
Organization (SCO). Asia-Pacific countries do not necessarily consider China's growing power 
to be negative as long as China is investing in other countries and becoming better integrated in 
the international society. China’s neighbors hope that through security and economic integration, 
China will be more willing to keep their interests in mind in accordance to the Regime Theory 
which states that “mutual interests can instigate compliance with regime norms among 
members.”90  
The phenomenon of strategic assimilation within Asia is important to the US, because 
these multilateral organizations and economic and political dialogues often exclude the US and 
other Western countries. Ironically, although the majority of regional organizations in Asia 
focused on conception to contain China and communism, Beijing has become one of the most 
active participants in Asian regional dialogues.91  Although US presence has been appreciated in 
the past, US presence in the region, especially military presence, has become viewed in a more 
negative light. Catchy phrases such as “places, not bases,” has begun to circulate throughout the 
region.92  Nevertheless, in recent years, Washington has appeared oblivious to the fact that they 
are being precluded from discussions over key issues and concerns in the region. In order to 
improve the overall economic and security issues in the Asia region, US policy makers must 
proactively participate in core dialogues, and analyze and respond to the unique regional issues. 
For the US to develop healthy relationship with China, they must first understand the Asia-
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Pacific region. This can be accomplished through actively investing in the region through 
investing and participating in regional multilateral diplomatic discussions such as the Asian 
Regional Forum and East Asia Summit and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations Plus 
dialogues.93 
The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
China’s dynamic relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
and the Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO), directly impacts how much leverage and 
influence Beijing has with neighboring governments. The most recognized regional organization 
in the Asia-Pacific region is ASEAN. ASEAN currently has ten members: Brunei Darussalam, 
Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Vietnam.94 Accurately identifying and comprehending China’s strong rapport with members of 
ASEAN, the SCO, and other regional organizations in the region is a vital step in pursuing 
America’s best interest in the region. What has contributed to ASEAN’s ability to thrive has 
been the agreement of non-interference and respect for sovereignty. This agreement is 
documented in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC).  The US government signed the 
TAC in order to demonstrate how serious the Obama Administration was on investing in the 
Asia region. The signing of this treaty reflected the contrasting behavior between the current US 
administration, and previous administrations. Former president Bush, weary of being regulated 
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by the non-interventionist ASEAN Way, adamantly refused to sign the TAC.  Bush believed that 
not being able to act freely would not be in America’s best national interest.95   
The maritime territory of the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) 
encompasses various economic strategic chokepoints. ASEAN’s compliance and defiance of 
certain Chinese policies directly affect China’s international trade, territorial claims, and political 
and military ambitions. ASEAN today has “emerged as a hub of regional multilateral 
diplomacy,” and has expanded into a multifunctional union, forming a type of umbrella 
organization. ASEAN currently encompasses many dialogues, including ASEAN Plus Three, 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation, and the ASEAN Regional Forum.96 ASEAN has had the 
most impact on Asian policy compared to any other regional security organization in the world, 
including the United Nations.  
Having recently celebrated its 43rd anniversary in 2010, ASEAN is currently dealing 
with a vastly different state of affairs in the region than when it was first established. ASEAN is 
no longer the only dominant regional organization in the region, and is now surrounded by 
separate entities and organizations that are striving for similar security goals in the region, such 
as the SCO. There are also several major dialogue forums such as the East Asia Summit, the 
Trilateral Strategic Dialogue, and the Shangri-La Dialogue. China is the most dominant country 
in the region, and is intimately involved in almost every one of these regional organizations. 
These numerous institutions link almost every South Asian country together in one form or 
another—whether it is economically, through defense and security cooperation, or by shared 
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borders or sea. Aside from the US, China is the largest ASEAN trading partner, and the biggest 
exporting target in Asia among the ASEAN members.97  
Beijing is creating allies of its own, and will soon no longer need the US’ support to 
maintain internal stability. China’s activities in the Asia-Pacific region have always been one of 
concern for ASEAN members. For example, in the late 1990s, China invaded the Mischief Reef, 
placing its soldiers on declared Filipino territory. Consequently, the Philippines became the first 
“ASEAN member … directly involved in a military stand-off with China.”98 Afraid of offending 
China, ASEAN was more concerned about China’s influence in the ASEAN Regional Forum 
(ARF) and did not want to hurt their Sino-ASEAN relationship by confronting China over the 
disputed Philippine islands. With the unpredictability of China’s actions, and more importantly 
since it was the most significant contributor in the ARF, China simultaneously became ASEAN’s 
strongest and “weakest link.”99  
Some say that the ASEAN Regional Forum was created in 1994 exclusively for the 
purpose of restraining China’s influence in the region.100 Although China is not a member of 
ASEAN, it is an active member of the ASEAN Regional Forum. The majority of ASEAN 
members have joined the organization out of necessity. Therefore it is very curious why China 
joined the ARF, despite the international leverage and power that it already possessed. 
According to the Modern Asian Studies journal, China was invited to join the ARF because 
ASEAN assumed that America would eventually withdraw from the Asia-Pacific region.101 In 
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addition, if China refused the offer to join the ARF, it would appear as if Beijing was actively 
seeking to become a supreme isolationist hegemony in the region. With the absence of US 
influence, it was assumed at the time that Japan would decide to grow militarily, and in response, 
China would increase its power in the region, and no other country would have the ability to 
restrain China or balance its power.102 China is no longer isolationist, and in the post-Cold War 
era has become more aggressive in its policies. The question has become whether the ARF has 
succeeded in better integrating China into the international community, or has created a power-
hunger entity that has the proper tools to get what it wants. However, it is most likely that China 
joined the ARF because it wanted to have a platform where it could influence the region’s 
politics. Unlike ASEAN, the ARF is a unique structure that provides extra regional powers to 
engage in discussions as well.103 If China succeeds in convincing other ASEAN members to 
agree with its policies, Beijing will be able to more effectively resist pressures from the West, 
especially in regards to amending China’s human rights policies.104 With the minimal role that 
the US has played in the ARF, China has had a chance to influence the ARF's policies from 
inside the organization.105  
Joining the ARF was also a way of reassuring other states that China was willing to 
cooperate with its neighbors. In addition, everything discussed and decided in the ARF would 
directly affect China. It was in Beijing’s best interest to slip into a position where it could 
“guide” the ARF in the right direction.106 Before joining the ARF, China was merely 
economically interdependent with ASEAN members. Joining the ARF caused China to become 
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linked to the region in the area of security and defense as well. According to the Regime Theory, 
now that China was actively in dialogue with these other nations, Beijing not only had an 
invested interest in protecting their own borders, but in providing for the national security of 
their economic partners as well.107 In recent years, China has reached out to aid the 
underdeveloped nation states in the region, and has generally respected each nation’s 
sovereignty.108 This has improved Beijing’s reputation among ASEAN states that regard non-
interference and sovereignty as the single most important aspect of multilateral foreign policy. 
Joining the ARF has helped China to become more integrated into the global system.109 Overall, 
there have been both positive and negative aspects to China’s membership in the ARF. Through 
China’s membership and participation in the ARF, Beijing has become somewhat more 
integrated with the international community and has on occasion cooperated with other 
countries, staying open to dialogue. This is a significant improvement of attitude compared to 
China’s foreign relations approach in the late 60s and early 70s.   
According to Dr. Surin, Secretary-General of ASEAN, “China’s economic growth and 
strong investment expansion is energizing the region and is providing ASEAN with a diversified 
market in an environment of slowing growth in its traditional partners.”110 ASEAN planned to 
create a China-ASEAN Free Trade Area (FTA) by 2010, and in January 2010, as planned, the 
FTA was fully implemented.111 In 2008, China comprised “11.3% of total ASEAN trade.”112 Dr. 
Surin sees this new FTA as very beneficial to ASEAN, and believes it will boost the 
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organizations status in the region while politically and economically as well.  “ASEAN needs to 
organise and prepare itself in terms of a stable and hospitable investment climate, a well-trained 
work-force and improved logistics to take advantage of the new investment prospects arising 
from this next wave of China’s expansion.”113  
China has invested billions of dollars in infrastructure projects among members of the 
organization.114 Joining the ARF has provided China with the ability to significantly promote its 
own agenda and convince other countries to accept their policies, without having to comply with 
international norms. Although China has historically harbored some aggressive domestic and 
international policies, President Hu’s administration has focused more on cooperation with its 
neighbors and partners, and as a general rule has respected the sovereignty of its surrounding 
nation states.115 Beijing has expressed an invested interest in its neighbors and has led 
discussions on topics such as the denuclearization of North Korea.116 Hu’s policies closely align 
with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ policy of noninterference and respect for a 
nation’s sovereignty, referred to as the ASEAN Way. Hu has also increasingly participated in 
multilateral discussions in an effort to engage in the international arena. This has helped calm 
some ASEAN nation’s suspicions that China is becoming an Asian hegemony, seeking to 
dominate the region.  Hu’s rallying support of like-minded states is certainly serving Beijing’s 
self-interest, and through emphasizing noninterference and respect for sovereignty, has created a 
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way to keep other nations from pressuring and interfering in China’s human-rights violations, not 
excluding the recent controversy over the imprisonment of Liu Xiaobo.117 
The Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) 
 In addition to participating in multilateral discussions such as the ARF, China has made 
further efforts to create a type of buffer against the US and Western influence in East Asia.118 
The SCO, established in 2001, is a regional organizational alliance between Uzbekistan and the 
Shanghai Five: Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and China. After the Cold War, 
China was afraid that there would be a power-vacuum in Central Asia that would cause regional 
instability. The close relationship between the “Shanghai Five” is beginning to fill the void that 
was left in the area after the collapse of the USSR. The SCO has the capability to become the 
most threatening, successful and powerful security organization in Asia.119 By establishing 
relationships with Southeast Asia and the Asia-Pacific through ASEAN, and with East Asia 
through the SCO, China has created a perfect lateral buffer zone against the US, surrounding 
itself with allies with an invested interest in Beijing. China bellies that US influence in the area 
challenges their “political and economic status quo.”120 
Although SCO is roughly 10 years old, it has demonstrated competency in dealing with a 
multitude of transnational and nontraditional issues such as terrorism and competition over 
energy resources. SCO is not purely a security organization, but aims to enhance collaboration in 
“trade, science and technology, culture, energy, and the environment” among its members.121 
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The SCO has voiced support for the ARF and other Asia-Pacific multilateral organizations, 
claiming to agree on security issues such as how to address the nuclearization and possible 
unification of the Korean peninsula. However, it took the SCO an entire year to even issue a 
statement on the 9/11 terrorist attack. Critics point out that SCO’s failure to make a statement 
immediately as a unilateral body against the terrorist attack showed a lack of collaboration within 
the organization.122  
Similar to the ASEAN Way, SCO operates under what is called the “Shanghai Spirit” 
when dealing with security and political relations within the region. The Shanghai Spirit 
promotes an “international security co-operation based on equality, mutual trust and respect.”123 
By treating each member with equality, SCO is making an effort to depart from the hierarchical 
structure that is often seen in Western organizations. Nevertheless, the power gap between the 
member countries in the organization forces some type of hierarchical structure.124 Although the 
SCO functions in a similar fashion as ASEAN, they have not been as successful in bringing 
nations together to participate in multinational dialogue to the extent that the Asian Pacific 
organization has.  
The SCO successfully extended their presence into the Asia region, while simultaneously 
characterizing the West as a harmful force. American and Western presence has often been 
blamed for local uprisings and protests, no matter how involved they were in reality. The SCO 
has now attained the status of “an alternative force in regional co-operation.”125 Although the 
SCO is rapidly rising to the status of a “balancing” power against the US in the region, the SCO 
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must continue to focus on clear internal development and strengthen the governments of its core 
members in order to adequately compete against the Western influence in Central and East Asia 
and exercise adequate leverage.126 US policy makers must come to terms with the fact that 
America is no longer the only body that is offering protection and assurance in regional security 
in Asia. SCO is similar to ASEAN in that its members prefer their relationships to be “based on 
cooperation and trust.” With China and Russia as its leaders, SCO is becoming an organization 
that demands to be recognized. The region is full of historical baggage and maintaining regional 
stability and security in spite of this is SCO’s goal. On June 17, 2009, the president of China, Hu 
Jintao, and Russia’s Dmitry Medvedev came together to celebrate 60 years of multilateral 
relations.127 
U.S. Foreign Policy Recommendations 
In the wake of the current financial crisis, Washington has had a rude awakening and is 
coming to realize the strategic significance of the Asia region. China has had the perfect 
opportunity to step in and act as a financial savior, keeping the Asian economy from collapsing 
through various measures such as refusing to change the value of its currency.128 China has 
exerted and expanded its influence in the region through providing financial assistance to its 
neighbors, while Washington continues to drain its money and energy in the Middle East, and 
spreading itself thin throughout the world.129 This has reinforced the feeling that the US is an 
“outsider” with only selfish interests in the area.130  US foreign policy has been preoccupied with 
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the Middle East over the past few years, and with the insecure dollar, the Asia region has started 
to look towards China for assistance and assurance of economic security.  
Need for Re-commitment 
As she embarked on her tour of the Asia-Pacific region, Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton emphasized US commitment to the region and declared Washington’s primary goal was 
“to sustain and strengthen America’s leadership in the Asia-Pacific region and to improve 
security, heighten prosperity, and promote our values.”131 In February of this year, following his 
trip to Southeast Asia, Kurt Campbell, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific 
Affairs, stated “that the year 2011 is a ‘consequential year for American policy in the Asia-
Pacific region.’”132  The current administration has made several positive steps toward 
reengaging in the region through participating in more regional and multinational dialogues. For 
example the US participated in the East Asian Summit last year and has plans to attend this year, 
and Washington is more actively involved in the ASEAN Defense Ministers Meeting that was 
recently established in 2006. The Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation is also scheduled to be 
hosted by the US this year, demonstrating that Washington recognizes the importance of US 
economic involvement in the region.  
 In order for the US to develop a strategic plan that is realistic and achievable and 
ultimately “strengthen[s] America’s leadership in the region,” current policies and public 
perception must be constantly cross referenced with facts. Although the US is, and will continue 
to be, the world’s economic leader, China is rapidly rising to the forefront of global influence.  
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The US must quickly adapt to the changes, recognize the trends, and respond in a way that will 
guide China in the direction that will help Washington achieve its foreign policy objectives while 
protecting the American people and maintaining stability in the Asia region. For the US to build 
a thriving relationship with the Asia-Pacific region, it must study and understand the economic 
needs and political desires of millions of people. This is no easy task.  The Asia-Pacific region is 
growing economically dependent on China, and China’s rapid growth and political leverage 
should be seen as a threat to the US. The US’ recommitment to the Asia-Pacific region is 
strategically important, and America must realize that the perfect balance between diplomacy 
and military reinforcement is the best policy when dealing with the Asia-Pacific region.  A good 
example of a balanced relationship between the US and an Asian country is between South 
Korea and the US. After the Korean War, the Republic of Korea (South Korea) and the US 
signed the 1953 Mutual Defense Treaty, where both nations pledged to actively pursue  “a more 
comprehensive and effective system of regional security” in the Asia-Pacific region.133 The US 
also heavily engages with South Korea economically and diplomatically, demonstrated by the 
active negotiations over the Republic of Korea- United States Free Trade Agreement (KORUS). 
Although this agreement is still un-ratified, it has been constantly negotiated over for the past 
several years, indicating a desire by both parties to strengthen their economic relationship.134 The 
KORUS is also important because it could provide a possible venue for pressuring corrupt and 
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unstable regimes in the region, such as North Korea, to pursue more regionally beneficial 
policies.135  
The US should view China’s rise in the Asia region as an opportunity to participate in 
more economic and political dialogue with Beijing. For America to successfully engage itself in 
the Asia-Pacific region, it needs to do two things: First, look at Asia as a whole, and second, 
simultaneously treat each nation as a unique entity that is contributing to the whole. China’s 
presence and activities are very significant to the Asia-Pacific region and understanding the 
desires and role of every member of ASEAN is an important step to understanding China. A 
strong relationship with more Asian countries, and US participation in numerous Asian 
economic and political forums is important, because in the future, any nation in the area may 
become a strategic access point to a crisis in the region.  For example, current US military 
presence and diplomatic relationship with both Japan and South Korea has led to increased 
multilateral cooperation between the countries, demonstrated by recent US-Japan and US-South 
Korea joint military exercises.136 These bilateral relationships have become increasingly 
important, especially with the current tense relationship between China and Taiwan, and the 
instability of the North Korean government.137  
The People’s Republic of China is becoming the most powerful country in Asia, and has 
become an indispensable political and economic force in the region. The US must become more 
politically and economically involved in the Asia region, change its foreign policy in a way that 
reflects a comprehensive understanding of China and its role in the region, while proactively 
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pursuing strategic relationships and dialogue among Asian countries. Kurt Campbell, in his most 
recent trip to Southeast Asia, reconfirmed the region’s economic importance to the US, and the 
US responsibility to encourage economic growth and “help with [its] economic recovery.”138 The 
current Obama administration should continue to encourage transparency in China’s economic 
policies.139 Significant progress in economic relations has been made between the US and China 
since the normalization of relations between the two countries in 1969.140  However, the US still 
holds several sanctions over China due to their human rights violations and their “threat of 
proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.”141 Currently, the majority of economic restrictions 
focus on restricting Chinese exports and imports of defense and military materials. Although the 
current economic sanctions are warranted, any additions to the sanctions should be thoroughly 
reviewed before being put into effect in order to optimize Chinese-US relations. The US should 
avoid isolationist or protectionist trends, or promotion of sanctions toward China that will 
ultimately weaken the US economic and political reputation in the region.142 If the US continues 
its current policy toward Asia and China, the rise of China and its proactive engagement with its 
Asian neighbors will soon overshadow US influence in Asia. While the US must increase its 
involvement in the region, it must also be very careful that Beijing does not interpret re-
engagement as “an effort to pit the countries in Asia against China.143 
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During her first official overseas trip after being appointed as U.S. Secretary of State, 
Hilary Clinton declared in Thailand that “The US is back,” reflecting the Obama administration’s 
pledge to re-engage itself in Asia.144 By traveling first to the Asia-Pacific region, her trip was a 
direct message to the world that America was going to re-invest in the region. Secretary Clinton 
has been very faithful in attending almost every important diplomatic and strategic meeting in 
Asia. President Barack Obama visited China in 2009 and discussed increasing cooperation, and 
building trust. Defense Secretary Robert M. Gates just recently traveled to China and had an in 
high-level conversation about military cooperation with President Hu Jintao.  However, paying 
lip service to the media and public officials about greater cooperation and seeking mutual 
interests will not result in achieving anything significant on the other side of the world. It is 
crucial that Washington learns to strategically communicate with China and its neighbors. It was, 
and still is, in the US’ national security interest to encourage and promote an Asian security 
environment that will not be a threat to the US, both domestically and internationally. 
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